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Secrecy and Self-Governance

War inevitably intensifies the tension between individual liberty and national
security. But there are wise and unwise ways to strike the appropriate balance. In the
years after 9/11, the Bush administration embraced a series of policies—including
torture, surveillance of private communications, clandestine detention of American
citizens, secret prisons in Eastern Europe, closed deportation proceedings, and
restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus—that undermined the fundamental
American values of individual dignity, personal privacy, and due process of law.
In my view, however, the most dangerous policy of the Bush administration was
its attempt to hide its decisions from the American public. In an effort to evade the
constraints of separation of powers, judicial review, checks and balances, and
democratic accountability, the Bush administration systematically promulgated its
policies in secret, denied information to Congress, abused the classification process,
narrowly interpreted the Freedom of Information Act, redacted vast quantities of
information from government websites, punished government whistleblowers, jailed
journalists for refusing to disclose their confidential sources, threatened to prosecute
the press for revealing the administration’s secret programs, and broadly invoked
executive immunity and the state secrets doctrine to prevent both Congress and the
courts from evaluating the lawfulness of its programs.
By shielding its decisions from legal, congressional, and public scrutiny, the Bush
administration undermined the single most central premise of a self-governing
society: it is the citizens who must evaluate the judgments, policies, and programs of
their representatives. As James Madison observed, “A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”1
I.	INTRODUCTION: FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Throughout American history, wartime administrations have limited public
discourse in the name of national security. In 1798, for example, on the eve of a
threatened conflict with France, Congress enacted the Sedition Act of 1798, which
effectively made it a crime for any person to criticize the President, the Congress, or
the government. 2 Although the Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, opposed the Act as a violation of the First Amendment, the Federalists,
led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, defended it as a wartime necessity.3
Similarly, during the Civil War, the Lincoln administration invoked martial law,
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, shut down “disloyal” newspapers, and
imprisoned critics of the President’s policies.4 And during World War I, the Wilson
administration advocated the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the
Sedition Act of 1918, which made it unlawful for any person to criticize the war, the
1.

9 James Madison, The Writings of James Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons
1910).

2.

Sedition Act of 1978, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (expired 1801).

3.

See Geoffrey R. Stone, War and Liberty: An American Dilemma 1–21 (2007).

4.

See id. at 22–40.
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draft, the government, the President, the flag, the military, or the cause of the United
States. The government prosecuted some two thousand individuals under these
statutes, with the consequence that free and open debate was stif led almost
completely.5
Measured by these standards, the efforts of the Bush administration to directly
suppress public debate after 9/11 were relatively modest. This was so, in part, because
of a fundamental shift in American law and culture. By the 1960s, a consensus had
emerged in the United States—both in the public understanding and in the courts—
that these past episodes had been grievous errors in which the nation had allowed
fear and partisan exploitation to override its commitment to individual liberty and
democratic self-governance. By the time of the Vietnam War, it had become clear
that the government could not constitutionally punish its critics, even in wartime,
merely because they questioned the wisdom, morality, or efficacy of government
policy.6 That consensus, which reflected a profound shift in American values and
law, has held to the present, with the result that the Bush administration—unlike
the Adams, Lincoln, and Wilson administrations—did not even attempt to prosecute
critics of its policies. This is an important milestone in American history. We should
not let it pass unnoticed or in any way take it for granted. Viewed historically, it is a
significant triumph for the rule of law.7
But this shift no doubt frustrated the Bush administration. If the government
cannot constitutionally control public discourse in time of war by simply silencing its
critics, how can it assert sufficient control over public debate to protect the national
security? The Bush administration settled on a new strategy: if it could not punish
citizens for criticizing its policies, then it should prevent them from knowing what
those policies are. After all, if citizens do not know what the government is doing,
they are hardly in a position to question its judgments.
Here, then, is the dilemma: The government often has exclusive possession of
information about its policies, programs, processes, and activities that would be of
great value to informed public debate. But government officials often insist that such
information must be kept secret, even from those to whom they are accountable—the
American people. How should we resolve this dilemma? The issue is complex and
has many dimensions.
The reasons why government officials want secrecy, for example, are many and
varied. They range from the truly compelling to the patently illegitimate. Sometimes,
government officials may want secrecy because they fear that the disclosure of certain
information might seriously undermine the nation’s security (for example, by revealing
detailed battle plans on the eve of battle). Sometimes, they may want secrecy because
they do not want to have to deal with public criticism of their decisions or because
they do not want the public, the Congress, or the courts to override their decisions,
5.

See id. at 41–63.

6.

See id. at 107–27.

7.

See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime From the Sedition Act of
1798 to the War on Terrorism 550–51 (2004).
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which they believe to be wise. Sometimes, they may want secrecy because disclosure
will expose their own incompetence or wrongdoing. Some of these reasons for secrecy
are obviously more worthy of deference than others.
Adding to the complexity, the contribution of the disclosure to informed public
discourse may vary widely depending upon the nature of the information. The
disclosure of some confidential information may be extremely valuable to public
debate (for example, the revelation of unwise or even unlawful government programs,
such as the Bush administration’s torture memos or its authorization of expanded
electronic surveillance). The disclosure of other confidential information, however,
may be of little or no legitimate value to public debate (for example, the publication
of the identities of covert American agents in Iran).
The most vexing problem arises when the public disclosure of secret information
is both harmful to national security and valuable to self-governance. Suppose, for
example, the government undertakes a study of the effectiveness of security measures
at the nation’s nuclear power plants. The study concludes that several nuclear power
plants are especially vulnerable to terrorist attack. Should this study be kept secret,
or should it be disclosed to the public? On the one hand, publishing the report would
reveal our vulnerabilities to terrorists. On the other hand, publishing the report
would alert the public to the situation, enable citizens to press government officials
to remedy the problems, and empower the public to hold accountable those public
officials who failed to keep the nation safe. The public disclosure of such information
could both cost and benefit the nation. Should the study be made public?
In theory, this question can be framed quite simply: Do the benefits of disclosure
outweigh the costs of disclosure? That is, does the value of the disclosure to informed
public deliberation outweigh the danger to the national security? As a practical
matter, however, this simple framing of the issue is not terribly helpful. It is
exceedingly difficult to measure in any objective, consistent, predictable, or coherent
manner either the “value” of the disclosure to public discourse or the “danger” to
national security. And it is even more difficult to balance such incommensurable
values against one another.
Moreover, even if we were to agree that this is the right question, we would still
have to determine who should decide whether the benefits outweigh the costs of
disclosure. Should this be decided by public officials whose responsibility it is to
protect the national security? By public officials who might have an incentive to
cover up their own mistakes? By low-level public officials who believe their superiors
are keeping information secret for inadequate or illegitimate reasons—that is, by
“leakers”? By reporters, editors, and bloggers who have gained access to the
information? By judges and jurors in the course of criminal prosecutions of leakers,
journalists, and publishers?
In this essay, I will focus on three questions. First, in Part II, I will consider the
circumstances in which the government can constitutionally punish a public employee
for disclosing classified information relating to national security to a journalist for the
purpose of publication. That is, in what circumstances may the government punish
leakers? Second, in Part III, I will explore the circumstances in which the government
84
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can constitutionally punish the press for publishing classified information. Should it
matter whether the press obtained that information through illegal leaks? Third, in
Part IV, I will examine the circumstances in which the government can constitutionally
compel a journalist to reveal the identity of her confidential sources. That is, in what
circumstances does the First Amendment grant the journalist a constitutional right
to refuse to disclose to a court the identity of the public employee who unlawfully
leaked classified information? As we shall see, these issues are as difficult as they are
important, and the governing law is often unformed and surprisingly obscure. I shall
try to bring some clarity to these questions.
II.	THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

The first question concerns the First Amendment rights of public employees. To
understand those rights, we must establish a baseline. Let us begin, then, with the
rights of individuals who are not government employees. That is, in what circumstances
may ordinary people, who are not public employees, be held legally accountable for
revealing information to a journalist for the purpose of publication? Answering this
question will enable us to establish a baseline definition of First Amendment rights.
We can then inquire whether the First Amendment rights of government employees
are any different.
In general, an ordinary individual (that is, an individual who is not a government
employee) has a broad First Amendment right to reveal information to journalists for
the purpose of publication.8 There are a few limitations, however.
First, the Supreme Court has long recognized that there are certain “limited
classes of speech,” such as false statements of fact, obscenity, and threats, that “are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas” and are therefore of only low First
Amendment value.9 Such speech may be restricted without satisfying the usual
demands of the First Amendment. For example, if X makes a knowingly false and
defamatory statement about Y to a journalist, with the understanding that the
journalist will publish the information, X might be liable to Y for the tort of
defamation.10 Or, if X reveals to a reporter that Y was raped, with the expectation
that the reporter will publish the information, X might be liable to Y for invasion of
privacy. The public disclosure of Y’s identity, unlike the fact of the rape, might be
thought of such slight value to public debate that it can be prohibited in order to
protect Y’s privacy.11
Second, private individuals sometimes voluntarily contract with other private
individuals to limit their speech. Violation of such a private agreement may be
actionable as a breach of contract. For example, if X takes a job as a salesman and
agrees as a condition of employment not to disclose his employer’s customer list to
8.

See Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 139, 139–40 (2001).

9.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).

10.

See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–48 (1974).

11.

See Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 178–79.
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competitors, he might be liable for breach of contract if he reveals the list to a reporter
for a trade journal with the expectation that the journal will disseminate the list. In
such circumstances, the individual has voluntarily agreed to limit what otherwise
would be a First Amendment right. Such privately negotiated waivers of constitutional
rights are generally enforceable.12
Third, there might be situations, however rare, in which an individual discloses
previously non public information to a journalist in circumstances in which publication
of the information would be so dangerous to society that the individual might be
punished for disclosing it to the journalist. For example, suppose a scientist discovers
how to produce the Ebola virus from ordinary household materials. The harm caused
by the public dissemination of that information might be so likely, imminent, and
grave that the scientist could be punished for facilitating its publication.13
These examples illustrate the few circumstances in which an individual might be
held legally responsible for disclosing information to a journalist for the purpose of
publication. However, as noted before, the First Amendment accords individuals
very broad freedom to share information with reporters for the purpose of
publication.
To what extent is a government employee in a similar position? When we ask about
the First Amendment rights of public employees, we must focus on the second of the
three situations examined above. It is the waiver of rights issue that poses the critical
question. Although the first and third situations are relevant in the public employee
context, it is the waiver issue that is at the very core of the matter.
At its most bold, the government’s position is simple: just like a private individual,
it should be able to enter into contracts with people in which they voluntarily agree
to waive their constitutional rights, and as long as the waiver is voluntary, that should
end the matter. This is not the law. The Supreme Court has long recognized that,
unlike private entities, the government cannot constitutionally insist that individuals
surrender their constitutional rights as a condition of public employment or receipt of
other government benefits.14 Surely, it would be unconstitutional, for example, for
the government to require individuals to agree as a condition of employment that
they will never criticize the President, never practice the Muslim faith, never have an
abortion, or never assert their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
It would be no answer for the government to point out that the individuals had
voluntarily agreed not to criticize the President, practice their faith, have an abortion,
or assert their Fourth Amendment rights, for even if individuals consent to surrender
their constitutional rights in order to obtain a government job, the government
cannot constitutionally condition employment on the waiver of those rights. As the
12.

See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).

13.

See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).

14.

See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons . . . . [It may not do so] on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”).
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Supreme Court has long held, “unconstitutional conditions” on public employment
violate the Constitution. The government cannot legitimately use its leverage over
jobs, welfare benefits, driver’s licenses, tax deductions, zoning waivers, and the like
to extract waivers of constitutional rights.15
This does not mean, however, that the government can never require individuals
to waive their constitutional rights as a condition of public employment. There are at
least two circumstances, relevant here, in which the government may restrict the
First Amendment rights of its employees. First, as the Supreme Court noted in its
1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, the government “has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general. The problem in any case,” the Court said, “is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of [its activities].”16 In other words, the government has a legitimate
interest in running effectively, and some restrictions of employee speech are reasonably
necessary and appropriate to achieve efficiency.
The Hatch Act, for instance, prohibits public employees from taking an active
part in political campaigns.17 The goal is to insulate public employees from undue
political pressure and improper influence. To enable public employees to perform
their jobs properly, the government may require them to waive what would otherwise
be their First Amendment right to participate in partisan political activities.18
Another illustration might involve a police officer who uses racist language in a
street encounter. In such circumstances, the police department might reasonably
conclude that the officer can no longer perform her job effectively in that
neighborhood, or that her continued employment would seriously undermine the
department’s credibility with the community.19 As Pickering observed, it may be
appropriate in such circumstances to “balance” the competing interests.20 Similarly, a
government employee’s disclosure of confidential information to a journalist for the
purpose of publication might jeopardize the government’s ability to function
effectively. For example, if an IRS employee gives a reporter X’s confidential tax
15.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 889, 914–15 (1986).

16.

391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In Pickering, a high school teacher was dismissed for writing a letter to a local
newspaper criticizing school policy. The Court held that the dismissal violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 564, 574–75.

17.

Hatch Political Activities Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).

18.

See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556–57 (1973); United Pub.
Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–96 (1947).

19.

Cf. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (holding that a police officer’s distribution of
sexually explicit video of himself on eBay was “detrimental to the mission and functions of the
employer”).

20. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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records, this might seriously impair the public’s confidence in the tax system and
thus undermine the government’s capacity to function efficiently.
A second reason why the government may sometimes restrict what otherwise
would be the First Amendment rights of public employees is that the employee learns
the information only by virtue of his government employment. Arguably, it is one
thing for the government to prohibit its employees from speaking in ways other
citizens can speak, but it is something else entirely for the government to prohibit
them from speaking in ways other citizens cannot speak. If a public employee gains
access to confidential information only because of his public employment, then
prohibiting him from disclosing that information to anyone outside the government
might be said not to restrict his First Amendment rights at all because he had no
right to know the information in the first place.21
There is little clear law on this question. In its 1980 decision Snepp v. United
States, however, the Supreme Court held that a former employee of the CIA could
constitutionally be held to his agreement not to publish “any information or material
relating to the [CIA]” without prior approval. 22 The Court did not suggest that every
government employee can be required to abide by such a rule. Rather, it emphasized
that a “former intelligence agent’s publication of . . . material relating to intelligence
activities can be detrimental to vital national interests.” 23 In light of Snepp and
Pickering, it seems reasonable to assume that a public employee who discloses classified
information relating to national security to a journalist for the purpose of publication
has violated his position of trust and ordinarily may be discharged and/or criminally
punished without violating the First Amendment.
Now, it is important to note that this conclusion is specific to public employees.
It does not govern those who are not public employees. Unlike public employees, who
have agreed to abide by constitutionally permissible restrictions of their speech,
journalists and publishers have not agreed to waive their rights. The analogy is to the
private employee who agrees not to disclose his employer’s customer lists. Although
he might be liable for breach of contract, the journalist to whom he discloses the list
and the trade journal that publishes it are not similarly answerable to the employer.
This distinction between public employees and other individuals is critical in the
context of confidential information. Information the government wants to keep
secret may be of great value to the public. The public disclosure of an individual’s tax
return may undermine the public’s confidence in the tax system, but it may also
reveal important information, for example, about a political candidate’s finances.
21.

See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (“A litigant has no First Amendment right
of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.”); see also Robert C. Post,
The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169, 174–79 (further discussing the
Rhinehart holding).

22.

444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980).

23.

Id. at 511–12; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 284–85 (1981) (finding that the record showed
defendant’s actions in breaking his agreement and divulging classified information “prejudiced the
ability of the United States to obtain intelligence, and [was] followed by episodes of violence against the
persons and organizations identified”).
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The conclusion that the government has a legitimate reason to prohibit its employees
from disclosing such information does not reflect a judgment that the government’s
interest in confidentiality necessarily outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure.
Indeed, information about a political candidate’s finances might be of great
significance to public debate, and it would plainly be unconstitutional for the
government to prohibit the dissemination of such information if it did not come from
the government’s own files.
In theory, of course, it would be possible for courts to decide in each instance
whether the First Amendment protects an unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information by a public employee because the value of the information to the public
outweighs the government’s need for secrecy. But such an approach would put courts
in an extremely awkward position and would in effect convert the First Amendment
into a constitutional Freedom of Information Act.24 The Supreme Court has eschewed
that approach and granted the government considerable deference in deciding
whether and when public employees may disclose confidential government
information. This is not to say that such disclosures are always punishable. In applying
Pickering and Snepp, courts do not give the government complete carte blanche to
insist on secrecy. The government’s restrictions must always be “reasonable.”25
Returning to the problem of confidential information relating to the national
security, the key issue involves classified information. The Bush administration
authorized the classification of any information whose public disclosure “reasonably
could be expected to result in damage to the national security.”26 The classification
system is a notoriously imperfect guide to the real need for confidentiality. The
concept “reasonably be expected to result in damage to the national security” is
inherently vague and plastic. It is impossible to know from this standard how likely,
imminent, or grave the potential harm must be. Moreover, the classification process
is poorly designed and sloppily implemented. Predictably, government officials tend
to overclassify. An official charged with the task of classifying information will
invariably err on the side of over- rather than underclassification. It is “better to be
safe than sorry,” and no official wants to be responsible for underclassification. In
addition, we know from experience that public officials have abused the classification
system to hide from public scrutiny their own misjudgment, incompetence, and
venality.27
24.

5 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. III 2009).

25.

Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.

26. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315, 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.fas.

org/sgp/bush/eoamend.html., amending Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).

27.

See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)
(“There exists the tendency, even in a constitutional democracy, for government to withhold reports of
disquieting developments and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to itself.”); Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1204 n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting “the well-documented practice of
classifying as confidential much relatively innocuous or noncritical information”); Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Foreword to Comm’n on Protecting & Reducing Gov’t Secrecy, Report of the
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, S. Doc. No. 105-2, at xxxix
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Despite these very real concerns, the courts have concluded that there are good
reasons to have clear, simple, and easily administered rules to guide the conduct of
public employees. As a result, the courts have held that a government employee
ordinarily can be disciplined, discharged, or prosecuted for knowingly disclosing
classified information to a journalist for the purpose of publication.28 Are there any
circumstances in which a public employee has a First Amendment right to disclose
classified information to a journalist? Courts have generally held that, in order for the
government to punish a public employee for the disclosure of classified information,
the government must at the very least prove that the disclosure would be “potentially
damaging to the United States.”29 Although this judgment is implicit in the very fact
of classification, the fact of classification is not deemed conclusive. Because the
classification process is imperfect, independent proof of at least potential harm to the
national security is required.
This is a far cry, however, from requiring the government to prove that the
disclosure will create a clear and present danger of grave harm to the nation. The gap
between these two standards represents the difference between the rights of public
employees and the rights of other individuals. It is what the public employee
surrenders as a condition of his employment, it is the effect of Pickering balancing,
and it is a measure of the deference we grant the government in the management of
its “internal” affairs.
There is, of course, a fundamental disadvantage in this approach. As we have
seen, information may be both potentially dangerous to national security and valuable
to public debate. Consider, for example, evaluations of new weapons systems, plans
for shooting down hijacked airplanes, and government policies on the use of torture.
One might reasonably conclude that some or all of this information should be
available to the public to enable informed public deliberation. But the approach to
public employee speech that I have described would ordinarily empower the
government to forbid the disclosure of such information.
Let there be no doubt, granting such deference to the government to determine
what information to withhold from the public inevitably overprotects government
secrecy at the expense of informed public debate. We accept this approach largely for
the sake of simplicity. But we should be under no illusions about its impact. This
standard gives inordinate weight to secrecy at the expense of public accountability.

(1997), http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/04dpm.pdf (indicating that by the mid1990s, 1336 government employees were authorized to classify information “top secret,” and more than
two million public employees and one million government contractors had “derivative classification”
authority); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and
National Security Secrecy, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 349, 354 (1986) (“[T]he [e]xecutive is inherently
self-interested in expanding the scope of matters deemed ‘secret’; the more that is secret, the more that
falls under executive control.”).
28. See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068; see also United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 618 (E.D. Va.

2006).

29. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071 .
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There is at least one situation in which a government employee must have a First
Amendment right to disclose classified information, even if the disclosure might
harm the national security. This arises when the disclosure reveals unlawful
government conduct. Applying the Pickering standard, the government has no
legitimate interest in keeping secret its own illegality, and the public has a compelling
interest in the disclosure of such information. Thus, even if the government ordinarily
can punish a public employee for disclosing classified information, that presumption
must disappear when the disclosure reveals the government’s own wrongdoing. The
government is, after all, accountable to the public. In a self-governing society, citizens
need to know when their representatives violate the law.30
III.	THE RIGHTS OF THE PRESS TO PUBLISH

This, then, brings me to the second question: In what circumstances may the
government constitutionally punish the press for publishing classified information?
This issue arose most recently in late 2005, after the New York Times revealed the
existence of the Bush administration’s secret surveillance of electronic
communications. 31 President Bush decried the publication of this information as
“shameful,”32 Republican congressmen labeled the publication “treason,”33 and former
attorney general Alberto Gonzales called for the Times to be criminally prosecuted.34
Despite all the bluster, no criminal prosecution ensued.35 Indeed, it is important to
note that in the entire history of the United States the government has never
prosecuted the press for publishing classified information relating to the national
security.
Of course, this does not mean such a prosecution is impossible. It may be that the
press has exercised great restraint and has never published confidential information
in circumstances in which a prosecution would be constitutionally permissible. Or, it
may be that the government has exercised great restraint and has never prosecuted
the press even though such prosecutions would have been constitutionally permissible.
30. Indeed, federal law forbids classification for the purpose of concealing “violations of law, inefficiency, or

administrative error.” Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,318 (Mar. 28, 2003).

31.

See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,
2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.

32.

David Stout, Bush Says U.S. Spy Program Is Legal and Essential, N.Y. Times (Dec. 19, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/politics/19cnd-prexy.html.

33.

David Remnick, Nattering Nabobs, New Yorker, July 10, 2006, at 33–34, available at http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710ta_talk_remnick; see also Rick Klein, House Votes to Condemn
Media over Terror Story, Bos. Globe, June 30, 2006, at A1.

34. Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, Wash. Post, May 22, 2006, at A04,

available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100348.
html.

35.

See also Michael Barone, Blowback on the Press, U.S. News & World Rep. (May 8, 2006), http://www.
usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060508/8barone.htm; Walter Pincus, Senator May Seek Tougher Law
on Leaks, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 2006, at A04, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/02/16/AR2006021602186.html.

91

Secrecy and Self-Governance

We cannot know the answer until we define the circumstances in which such a
prosecution would be consistent with the First Amendment.
Because there has never been such a prosecution, the Supreme Court has never
had occasion to rule on such a case. The closest it has come to such a situation was
New York Times Co. v. United States, also known as “the Pentagon Papers case,” in
which the Court held unconstitutional the Nixon administration’s effort to enjoin
the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a purloined copy of a
top-secret Defense Department study of the Vietnam War.36 Justice Stewart’s opinion
best captures the view of the Court: “We are asked,” he wrote,
to prevent the publication . . . of material that the Executive Branch insists
should not, in the national interest, be published. I am convinced that the
Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I
cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. 37

Thus, in the Pentagon Papers case, the Court held that although elected officials
have broad authority to keep classified information secret, once that information gets
into the hands of the press the government has only very limited authority to prevent
its further dissemination.
This may seem an awkward, even incoherent, state of affairs. If the government
can constitutionally prohibit public employees from disclosing classified information
to the press in the first place, then why can’t it enjoin the press from publishing that
information if a government employee unlawfully leaks it? But one could just as easily
f lip the question. If the press has a First Amendment right to publish classified
information unless publication will “surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to our Nation or its people,” then why should the government be allowed to
prohibit its employees from revealing such information to the press merely because it
poses a potential danger to the national security? If we view the issue from the
perspective of either the public’s right to know or the government’s interest in secrecy,
it would seem logical that the same rule should apply to both public employees and
the press. The very different standards governing public employees on the one hand,
and the press on the other, present a puzzle.
There are, however, plausible reasons for this seemingly peculiar state of affairs.
As we have seen, the government has broad authority to prohibit public employees
from disclosing classified information to the press. This rule is based not on a careful
balancing of the government’s need for secrecy versus the public’s need for information,
but rather on the need for a clear and easily administrable rule for public employees.
For the sake of simplicity, the law governing public employees overprotects the
government’s legitimate interest in secrecy. But the need for a simple rule for public
employees has nothing to do with the rights of the press or the needs of the public,
as such. And under ordinary First Amendment standards, the press has broad
freedom to publish information of value to public debate unless, at the very least, the
36. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
37.

Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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government can prove that the publication poses a clear and present danger of grave
harm.38 In this situation, the law overprotects the press’ right to publish, relative to a
case-by-case balancing of value against danger.
This is surely a “disorderly situation,” but it arguably works. If we grant the
government too much power to punish the press, then we risk too great a sacrifice of
public deliberation; if we grant the government too little power to control
confidentiality “at the source,” then we risk too great a sacrifice of secrecy and
government efficiency.39 The solution has thus been to reconcile the irreconcilable
values of secrecy and accountability by guaranteeing both a strong authority of the
government to prohibit leaks and an expansive right of the press to publish them.40
Four questions remain: First, does the same constitutional standard govern
criminal prosecutions and prior restraints? Second, what sorts of disclosures might
satisfy the Pentagon Papers standard? Third, how should we deal with information
that both satisfies the Pentagon Papers standard and contributes significantly to
public debate? And fourth, does this peculiar doctrinal structure actually work?
In the Pentagon Papers case, the Court emphasized that it was dealing with an
injunction against speech. An injunction is a prior restraint, a type of speech
restriction that, in the Court’s words, bears a particularly “heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity.”41 This raises the question of whether the test stated in the
Pentagon Papers case should govern criminal prosecutions as well as prior restraints.
In dealing with expression at the very heart of the First Amendment—speech
about the conduct of government itself—the distinction between prior restraint and
criminal prosecution should not carry much weight. Thus, in my view, the standard
used in the Pentagon Papers case is essentially the same test the Court would use in
a criminal prosecution of the press for publishing information about the conduct of
government. Indeed, it was partly for this reason that the Bush administration did
not prosecute the New York Times for disclosing the existence of the secret National
Security Agency (NSA) surveillance program—the government could not
constitutionally have won such a prosecution.
Is there, then, any speech that could constitutionally be punished under this
standard? The examples traditionally offered were “the sailing dates of transports” or
the precise “number and location of troops” in wartime.42 The publication of such
information would instantly make American troops vulnerable to enemy attack and
thwart battle plans already underway. Other examples might include publication of
the identities of covert CIA operatives in Iran or public disclosure that the government
has broken the enemy’s secret code, thus alerting the enemy to change its cipher. In
situations like these, the harm from publication might be sufficiently likely, imminent,
and grave to warrant punishing the disclosure.
38. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
39.

Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 78–80 (1975).

40. See id. at 86–88.
41.

See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714; id. at 723 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).

42.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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An important feature of these illustrations often passes unnoticed. What makes
these examples so compelling is not only the nature and magnitude of the harm, but
also the implicit assumption that the information does not contribute to public
debate. In most circumstances, there is no apparent value in having the public know
the secret “sailing dates of transports” or the secret “location of American troops” on
the eve of battle. It is not as if these matters will instantly be topics of political
discussion. After the fact, of course, such information may be critical in evaluating
the effectiveness of our military leaders, but at the very moment the ships are set to
sail or the troops are set to attack, it is less clear what contribution that information
would make to public debate. My point is not that these examples involve “low” value
speech in the conventional sense of the term, but rather that they involve information
that does not seem particularly “newsworthy” at the moment, and that this factor
plays an implicit but central role in making these illustrations so persuasive.
The failure to notice this feature of these hypotheticals can lead to a critical
failure of analysis. Interestingly, an analogous failure was implicit in the famous
example Justice Holmes first used to elucidate the clear and present danger test—the
false cry of fire in a crowded theatre.43 Why can the false cry of fire be restricted?
Because it creates a clear and present danger of a mad dash to the exits. Therefore,
Holmes reasoned, the test for restricting speech must be whether it creates a clear
and present danger of serious harm.44
But Holmes’ reasoning was spurious. Suppose the cry of fire is true? In that case,
we would not punish the speech—even though it still causes a mad dash to the
exits—because the value of the speech outweighs the harm it creates. Thus, at least
two factors must be considered in analyzing this situation: the harm caused by the
speech and the value of the speech. Suppose, for example, a newspaper accurately
reports that American troops in Afghanistan recently murdered twenty members of
the Taliban in cold blood. As a result of this publication, members of the Taliban
could quite predictably kidnap and murder twenty American citizens. Can the
newspaper constitutionally be punished for disclosing the initial massacre? I would
argue no. Even if there was a clear and present danger that the retaliation would
follow, and even if we agree that this is a grave harm, the information is simply too
important to the American people to punish its disclosure.
What this suggests is that to justify the criminal punishment of the press for
publishing classified information, the government must prove not only that the
defendant published classified information, the publication of which would result in
likely, imminent, and grave harm to the national security, but also that the publication
would not significantly contribute to public debate.
Finally, there is the question of whether this “disorderly situation” ultimately
serves the public interest. The theory is that, because it is impossible to balance in an
ad hoc manner the government’s interest in keeping information confidential against
the public’s interest in knowing the information, we instead adopt twin doctrines
43.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

44. Id.
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that, on the one hand, overprotect the government’s authority to keep information
confidential and, on the other hand, overprotect the press’ right to publish information
that comes into its hands. In theory, it all balances out and the common good is
served.
The problem with this theory is that government power to classify is so broad,
and its power to punish leaders is so great, that the “balance” is tilted too heavily on
the side of the government. Although it would, indeed, be impossible to balance the
competing interests in an ad hoc manner with respect to all information in the
government’s possession, one way to redress the current imbalance would be to
change the circumstances in which the government can classify information. That is,
the Supreme Court should hold that, under the First Amendment, the government
cannot constitutionally classify information merely because it “could reasonably be
expected to cause damage to the national security.”45 Rather, to classify information
and thus block its disclosure to the public, the government should have to demonstrate
that unauthorized disclosure of the material would be likely to cause serious damage
to the national security.46 Of course, phrases like “likely” and “serious” can be
manipulated, but they would at least emphasize the danger that overclassification
poses to the very essence of effective self-governance.47
IV.	The Journalist-Source Privilege

This brings me to the third question: In what circumstances can the government
constitutionally compel a journalist to reveal the identity of an individual who
unlawfully leaked classified information to the journalist to enable her to publish it?
Put differently, to what extent does the First Amendment recognize a journalistsource privilege? The goal of most legal privileges is to promote open communication
in circumstances in which society wants to encourage communication. There are
many such privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient
privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the privilege for confidential spousal
communications, and the priest-penitent privilege. In each of these instances, three
judgments support the existence of the privilege: First, the relationship is one in
which open communication is important to society. Second, in the absence of a
privilege, such communication will be inhibited. And third, the cost to the legal
system of losing access to the privileged information is outweighed by the benefit to
society of open communication in the protected relationship.
The logic of the journalist-source privilege is similar. Public policy certainly
supports the idea that individuals who possess information of significant value to the
public ordinarily should be encouraged to convey that information to the public. But
45.

See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315, 15,328–29 (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/bush/eoamend.html (amending Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17,
1995)).

46. For an excellent proposal along these lines, see Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional

Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 948–76 (2006).

47.

See id. at 976.
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some individuals who possess such information may be reluctant to have it known
that they are the source. They may fear retaliation, gaining a reputation as a “snitch,”
losing their privacy, getting sued or prosecuted, or simply getting “involved.”
A congressional staffer, for example, may have reason to believe that a senator
has taken a bribe. She may want someone to investigate but may not want to get
involved personally. Or, an employee of a corporation may know that his employer is
manufacturing an unsafe product but may not want coworkers to know that he was
the source of the leak. In such circumstances, individuals may be reluctant to disclose
the information to the press unless they have some way to protect their confidentiality.
Without a journalist-source privilege, these sources may decide that silence is the
better part of wisdom. A journalist-source privilege thus makes sense for the same
reason the attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege make sense. It is in society’s interest to encourage
the communication, and without a privilege the communication will often be
chilled.
Does the First Amendment protect such a privilege? The Supreme Court
addressed this question in its 1972 decision, Branzburg v. Hayes.48 The four dissenting
Justices concluded that “when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and
reveal confidences,” the government should be required to “demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information.”49 The majority, however, rejected this
conclusion, holding that the First Amendment does not give a reporter a constitutional
right to refuse to disclose relevant information to a grand jury.50
The Court reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, as a general matter of
First Amendment interpretation, the Court is reluctant to invalidate a law merely
because it has an incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms.51 Laws that directly
regulate expression (for example, “No one may criticize the government” or “No one
may distribute leaflets on the Mall”) are the central concern of the First Amendment.52
Laws that only incidentally affect free expression, however, are of only peripheral
First Amendment concern. Examples of such laws would include a speed limit, as
applied to someone who speeds in order to get to a political demonstration on time,
and a law prohibiting public urination, as applied to someone who urinates on a
government building in order to express his disdain for the government. The Court
has held that such laws will almost never violate the First Amendment. Indeed,
except in highly unusual circumstances in which the incidental effect of a law might
inadvertently have a severe impact on First Amendment freedoms, the Court routinely
rejects such First Amendment challenges.53
48. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
49. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 708–09 (majority opinion).
51.

Id. at 682–83.

52.

See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century,
36 Pepp. L. Rev. 273, 297–98 (2009).

53.

Id.
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The reason for this doctrine is not that such laws cannot dampen First
Amendment rights, but that a rule that allowed every law to be challenged whenever
it impinges even indirectly on someone’s freedom of expression would be a judicial
nightmare.54 Does an individual have a First Amendment right not to pay taxes
because taxes reduce the amount of money he has available to buy books or to support
political causes? Does an individual have a First Amendment right to violate a law
against public nudity because she wants to picket in the nude? Does a reporter have
a First Amendment right to violate laws against burglary or wiretapping because
burglary and wiretapping will enable him to get a story? To keep life simple, and to
avoid such intractable and ad hoc line-drawing, the Court simply presumes that laws
of general application are constitutional, even as applied to speakers and journalists,
except in extraordinary circumstances.55 Predictably, the Court invoked this principle
in Branzburg.56 The law requiring witnesses to testify is not directed against free
speech and has only an incidental effect on journalists and their sources. It is therefore
presumptively constitutional.
Second, recognition of a First Amendment-based journalist-source privilege
would have required the Court to decide who, exactly, is a “journalist.” For the Court
to decide this question as a matter of First Amendment interpretation would have flown
in the face of more than two hundred years of constitutional precedent. The idea of
defining or “licensing” the press in this manner is anathema to our constitutional
tradition. As the Court observed in Branzburg, if it had recognized a First Amendment
journalist-source privilege, “it would be necessary to define those categories of
newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer . . .
just as much as [it is] of the large metropolitan publisher.”57
V. Conclusion

As I have tried to show, it is not easy to reconcile the interest in protecting the
national security with the often competing interests in preserving a free and
responsible press and an informed electorate. When all is said and done, the First
Amendment does not and cannot solve all of our problems. The Constitution serves
as an important, but only limited, safeguard against undue government secrecy. As
construed by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment gives strong protection to
the press when it publishes even classified information relating to the national
security, even when it was leaked unlawfully, but it gives the press and the public
essentially no constitutional right to demand such information from the government—
and it gives public employees only a very limited right to disclose such information to
the press.
54. See id. at 298.
55.

See id. at 297.

56. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
57.

Id. at 704.
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What is needed, then, to rein in the sorts of abuses we saw under the Bush
administration is not so much a change in constitutional law but a change in public
policy, either in the form of executive action or congressional legislation. With the
election of Barack Obama in 2008, there was every reason to expect a greater
commitment to a more open approach to executive transparency and accountability.
To what extent has the Obama administration achieved this goal?
By the end of the Bush administration, there were at least four obvious changes
in government policy that could significantly have improved the situation. First,
either by executive order or congressional amendment of the Freedom of Information
Act,58 the government should no longer classify information merely because its
disclosure might have the potential to harm the national security. This standard,
which dates back to an October 2001 directive from then attorney general John
Ashcroft, does not adequately protect the compelling national interest in preserving
an open and responsible government.59
Indeed, prior administrations had employed a more restrained approach. The
Clinton administration, for example, denied classification whenever there was a
“significant doubt” about the need to classify.60 The Reagan and Bush I administrations
required administrative review within thirty days whenever there was “reasonable
doubt” about the necessity for classification.61 The Carter administration denied
classification to any document for which there was “reasonable doubt” about the
propriety of classification.62 And the Ford and Nixon administrations allowed
classification only upon a finding that “unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause damage to the national security.”63 After taking office, President
Obama repealed the Ashcroft standard and reinstated the “significant doubt” test
that had prevailed in the Clinton administration.64 Whether this is ultimately the
“right” standard for classification, Obama’s action was certainly a significant step in
the right direction.

58. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III 2009).
59.

Memorandum from Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft on the Freedom of Information Act to Heads of All Fed.
Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/011012.htm
(establishing “sound legal basis” standard for DOJ defense of FOIA non-disclosure decisions, replacing
the stricter “foreseeable harm” standard).

60. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,826 (Apr. 17, 1995), available at http://www.fas.

org/sgp/clinton/eo12958.html.

61.

See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/eo12356.htm.

62. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (June 28, 1978), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
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64. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 708 (Dec. 29, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
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Second, after the experiences of the Bush II administration, it seemed clear that
Congress needed to enact legislation that would afford greater protection to national
security whistleblowers. Perhaps most importantly, it is essential to protect those
public employees who disclose unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful government
actions. With the dawn of the Obama administration, members of Congress
enthusiastically introduced the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009,
which offered substantial protection to government whistleblowers.65 Only three
months after his inauguration, a bipartisan group from the House sent a letter to the
President urging him to support the bill and to issue an executive order affording
federal whistleblowers greater protection.66 Although candidate Obama had expressed
support for a law protecting federal whistleblowers during the 2008 presidential
campaign,67 his administration has not taken any significant steps toward strengthening
whistleblower protections. Moreover, the President took no action in response to the
letter, and news accounts have described his administration as “proving more aggressive
than the Bush administration in seeking to punish unauthorized leaks.”68 The
whistleblower protection bill still languishes in committee.
Third, the state secrets privilege is a common-law doctrine designed to enable
the government to protect sensitive national security information from disclosure in
litigation. The Bush administration repeatedly invoked the privilege in an
unprecedented manner in order to block judicial review of a broad range of
questionable constitutional practices, including the secret NSA surveillance program,
the secret rendition of alleged terrorists, and challenges to the legality of the dismissal
of government whistleblowers.69 The beginning of the Obama administration brought
hope that Congress would enact the proposed State Secrets Protection Act of 2009,
which was intended both to clarify and to limit the permissible scope of the doctrine.70
After President Obama took office, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a
memorandum limiting the scope of the doctrine, requiring the approval of the
attorney general’s office for its use, and authorizing its invocation “only when genuine
and significant harm to national defense or foreign relations is at stake and only to
65.

See S. 372, 111th Cong. (2010), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_
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the extent necessary to safeguard those interests.”71 Since then, however, the Obama
administration has continued to aggressively assert the privilege in litigation involving
such issues as the CIA’s use of extraordinary rendition and the NSA’s practice of
wiretapping American citizens, and it has taken no significant steps to support the
legislation.72
Fourth, the events during the Bush administration made clear that it was long
past time for Congress to create a statutory journalist-source privilege. Although the
Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment privilege in Branzburg, forty-nine states
and the District of Columbia have recognized such a privilege either by statute or
common law.73 Congress should rectify the federal omission by enacting the Free
Flow of Information Act, which would recognize a qualified journalist-source
privilege as a matter of federal law.74 This statute would enable journalists to protect
the confidentiality of their sources unless the government could prove disclosure of
the protected information is necessary to prevent significant harm to the national
security that “outweigh[s] the public interest in gathering or disseminating news or
information.” 75 In what seems to be a recurring theme, then senator Obama supported
the Free Flow of Information Act but later shifted gears when he assumed the
presidency. In 2007, he was one of the cosponsors of the original Senate bill.76 But in
2009, he objected to the scope of the privilege envisioned by the bill and requested
the Senate to require judges to defer to executive branch judgments on matters of
national security, rather than to make their own independent judgments on such
issues.77 Former senator Arlen Specter (D-PA), another of the bill’s cosponsors,
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rightly called the President’s changes “totally unacceptable.” 78 Although the bill
passed in the House, it is still pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee.79
The performance of the Obama administration on these four issues—especially
the latter three—has surely disappointed expectations. This is a lesson in “trust us.”
Those in power are always certain that they themselves will act reasonably. They
therefore resist limitations on their own discretion. The problem is that “trust us” is
no way to run a self-governing society.
Some measure of secrecy is, of course, essential to the effective functioning of
government, especially in wartime. But the Bush administration’s obsessive secrecy
intentionally and dangerously constrained meaningful oversight by Congress, the
press, and the public, directly undermining the vitality of democratic governance.
Looking back over those past eight years, one cannot escape the inference that the
cloak of secrecy imposed by the Bush administration had less to do with the war on
terrorism than with its desire to insulate executive action from public scrutiny. Such
an approach to self-governance weakens our democratic institutions and renders our
nation less secure in the long run. Alas, the Obama administration has done too
little to redress the situation, and it therefore remains true that a serious reconsideration
of our laws is necessary if we are to preserve the most fundamental elements of our
liberty.

78. Id.
79. H.R. 985 passed in the House on March 31, 2009; no action has been taken since it was referred to the
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